Options contracts can provide trading partners with enhanced flexibility to respond to uncertain market conditions and allow for superior capacity planning thanks to early information on future demand. We develop an analytical framework to value options on capacity for production of non-storable goods or dated services. The market set-up is as follows: During the contract market, period 0, the seller as the von Stackelberg leader announces a two-part tariff (r, e), consisting of an immediately payable reservation fee r and an execution fee e, due in the event the option is executed in period 1. The buyer in turn decides on how many options Q to purchase. Decisions are made under uncertainty: The buyer's future demand, the seller's future marginal costs as well as the future spot price are uncertain, the latter being impacted neither by the buyer nor the seller. During the spot market session, i.e., in period 1, the buyer may execute his options or satisfy his entire or additional demand from a competing seller in the spot market. The seller allocates reserved capacity now being called and attempts to sell remaining capacity into the spot market. Analytical expressions for the buyer's optimal reservation quantity and the seller's optimal tariff are derived, making explicit the risk-sharing benefits of options contracts accruing to both buyer and seller. The combination of an options contract and a spot market is demonstrated to be Pareto improving as compared to alternative market schemes. An analysis of the determinants of the efficiency gain characterizes industries particularly suitable to the options approach.
Introduction
Options have attracted enormous attention not only in the context of financial markets, fueled by the seminal article by Black and Scholes (1973) , but also recently as so called real options. Real options serve to quantify managerial and operational flexibility with regard to an investment project, whose inherent expansion, contraction and termination opportunities are considered options and priced according to the Black-Scholes framework (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . Exogenous risks such as demand uncertainty and real price risk can thus be modeled more accurately than traditional discounted cash-flow models would allow (Huchzermeier and Cohen, 1996) .
Extending the theory of real options, we propose a framework for valuation of options on capacity to produce non-storable goods or dated services, such as electricity or transportation service. Our approach to pricing this type of options results from game theoretic modeling of market interactions between buyer and seller, which takes us beyond the usual Black-Scholes framework. Options on capacity are not only interesting from a theoretical point of view, but can be considered to be highly relevant in practice: take as an example the Californian electricity market, which is characterized by high price volatility.
The lack of suitable long-term (options) contracts for the electricity generators to hedge against such dramatic spot price volatility leads to a high default risk for energy providers (Financial Times, 2001 ). Wilson (2001) emphasizes the importance of appropriate tools of risk management in electricity markets. The air cargo industry's strive for improved capacity utilization by initiating long-term forward contracts (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2001 ) may be complemented by options contracts.
The main contribution of this paper is (i) to explicitly incorporate all relevant exogenous risk factors 1 , i.e., demand, price and cost risk, into a game-theoretic market model for the valuation of options on capacity, (ii) we derive analytical expressions for the buyer's optimal reservation quantity and the seller's optimal options tariff, making explicit the risk-sharing benefits of options contracts accruing to both buyer and seller. In this general setting, (iii) we are able to show that a combined options and spot market is strictly Pareto improving as compared to alternative market schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The related literature is briefly presented in section 2. In section 3, we illustrate our market model and derive analytical results for the buyer's optimal reservation quantity and the seller's optimal tariff. Section 4 is devoted to discussing welfare enhancing properties of the combined options and spot market scenario, while section 5 presents the managerial implications. We conclude in section 6. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
Literature Review
A survey of the related literature shows that contingency contracts have received considerable interest previously. However, either strategic interactions between buyer and seller have not been taken into account or uncertainty has been limited to either price or demand. Lariviere (1999) provides an overview on stochastic modeling issues with respect to supply chain con tracts, while Tsay et al. (1999) review general modeling aspects for supply chain contracts. The therein derived taxonomy of issues tackled so far shows this gap in the theory we intend to bridge by making explicit the exogenous demand, price and cost risk in a game-theoretic options pricing model.
The starting point for our analysis is Wu et al. (2002) , who determine buyer and seller strategies in a similar framework, however limited to uncertainty in the spot price. At various points in this paper, we shall compare their results to our findings. In Spinler et al. (2002) , we focus on the benefits of the options scenario with regard to cost management in a supply chain. Gunepundi et al. (2001) consider the provision of information goods in a set-up consisting of a forward and a spot market. Thus, the contractual arrangement is simpler, emphasis is put on a more detailed discussion of the seller's behavior in the spot market. Optional supply contracts are analyzed by Cachon and Lariviere (2001) who then focus on the issue of information sharing in a supply chain with options tariffs being given exogenously. Lariviere and Porteus (2000) investigate contractual arrangements between a seller and a retailer in a newsvendor setting . Optimal procurement strategies in the presence of spot markets are analyzed by Seifert et al. (2002) , however, from the buyer's perspective only with exogenously set contract price. In this setting, they elaborate on risk attitudes of the buyer.
Supply contracts with options for storable goods are presented in Barnes-Schuster et al.
(1998) by means of a multi-stage newsboy model, i.e., from the seller's perspective. Again with respect to inventory decisions, Serel et al. (2001) analyze long-term contracts in the presence of a spot market alternative with deterministic prices. Burnetas and Gilbert (2001) , recurring to a newsboy type model, analyze the trade-off between higher demand uncertainty when purchase decisions are made early in a forward market and larger procurement costs when ordering is delayed. Options as a hedging instrument against price and quantity uncertainty with respect to inventory management are proposed by Ritchken and Tapiero (1986) . Li and Kouvelis (1999) study flexible contracts under deterministic demand and uncertain price utilizing a binomial lattice. Kamian and Li (1990) propose subcontracting as an option to cope with variability in capacity utilization, which complements our approach of hedging against demand uncertainty. Even in a completely deterministic environment, Erhun et al. (2000) are able to demonstrate efficiency gains stemming from a spot market complementing reservation contracts.
Electricity markets are an important field of application for our framework, therefore studies by Green (1999) , Newbery (1998) and Powell (1993) on UK's electricity (forward) contract markets are of considerable interest, even though emphasis is put on market power and industrial organization issues. Allaz and Vila (1993) analyze efficiency issues with regard to forward and spot markets.
Finally, a large body of literature on yield management, for a taxonomy see Weatherford and Bodily (1992) , illustrates an efficient method to cope with demand uncertainty when total capacity is limited, even though a key requirement to apply it, the ability to segment customers, is not presumed here. Furthermore, yield management in B2B relationships is often complicated by the fact that beyond price other parameters matter, such as reliability, quality, existing relationships etc.. Figure 1 illustrates the interactions relevant to our two-period market model. There is a single buyer and a single seller in the contract market and a spot market with a competitive fringe yielding an exogenous spot price, influenced neither by the buyer nor the seller. The seller acts in this game as the von Stackelberg leader by bidding in period 0 a two-part tariff for options on his capacity, which is utilized to produce in period 1 a non-storable good or a dated service. We focus on these product characteristics in order to separate the contracting and bidding strategies from potential inventory decisions. Furthermore, JIT production systems have found such widespread use that non-storability can be encountered in a variety of industrial contexts even if storability is not an issue. The tariff consists of a reservation fee r, which is due immediately if options are purchased, and an execution fee e, payable in the event that the options are executed in period 1. The buyer, in turn, decides on how many options to purchase. In period 1, the buyer decides on whether to execute his options or to resort to a back-stop technology provided in the spot market where he might also satisfy excess demand beyond the pre-contracted amount. The seller allocates the pre-contracted capacity which is now called and attempts to find buyers for the remaining capacity. Exemplary trading period lengths are provided in the figure, which may vary, of course, depending on the particular industry.
The Market Model
Uncertainty is incorporated via state-contingency. The structure of the game allows us to proceed with backward induction, thus we solve through dynamic programming the buyer's problem first, which yields the optimal reservation quantity as a function of the execution and the reservation fee. Given this information, the seller maximizes his profit by choosing an optimal tariff.
The Buyer's Optimal Contract and Spot Consumption Portfolio
In the following, state-contingency is marked by a tilde, the derivative w.r.t. the first variable by a subscript 1, w.r.t. the second variable by 2, repeated appropriately for higher derivatives. The buyer is characterized by a standard quasi-linear indirect utility functioñ
The willingness-to-pay (WTP) functionŨ is assumed to be affine separable, i.e.,
, where Z is assumed to be increasing and concave to reflect diminishing marginal utility. The functionΦ represents the state-contingent component of the buyer's WTP, which is assumed to increase with improving economic conditions, i.e.,Φ 1 > 0. The quantity of options executed in the spot market is denoted byq e , the quantity purchased from the back-stop technology in the spot market byq s . The second term in equation (1) represents the payment due in period 0, while the third term incorporates the payment due in the event that options are executed, with e representing the execution fee. Finally, the purchase from the spot market is given by the last term, with the exogenously determined spot priceP s (ω) ≡ pΨ(ω), p > 0, which is increasing in ω, i.e.,Ψ 1 > 0.
Let us define the spot market demand byD s ≡Ũ for which we requireΛ 1 < 0, for all ω, such that the inverse exists for the entire interval ω > 0. The economic meaning of the derivative ofΛ being negative is that for improving economic conditions, the spot price rises faster than . the buyer's marginal WTP.
In the spot market, the buyer solves the following program to compute his optimal spot and contract consumption:
To determine then the optimal reservation quantity Q(e, r), we determine in a second step the solution to the following maximization of the buyer's expected utility:
Lemma 1 Solving program (2), we need to distinguish between two cases. Case A occurs if the marginal WTP at the pre-contracted amount Q is at least as large as the execution fee e at that state of the world where the spot priceP s equals the execution fee e, i.e.,
1 (e/Φ (Ψ −1 (e/p))). Case B is the complementary case.
Proof: All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
As will become evident below from the buyer's options execution policy, we designate case A full execution and case B partial execution. The condition of the Lemma can also be expressed in terms of spot market demand: case A occurs, if the spot demandD s at a price equal to the execution fee e is at least as large as the pre-contracted quantity Q.
Each case entails different strategies for the buyer and the seller and we shall derive in section 3.4 the decision criterion for the seller when choosing among case A and B. We start by investigating case A.
Case A: Full Execution
The following lemma characterizes the optimal consumption portfolio for the buyer in the spot market period for case A as a solution to program (2).
Lemma 2 The optimal contract consumption in period 1 for case A is either to execute all options or none. The spot consumption is state-contingent (see Table 1 ). Note that the buyer's total demand in the spot market,q e * +q s * , exhibits a kink at that state of the world where he starts to consume from the contract only, i.e., at
. Making use of Lemma 2, we can state the buyer's expected utility as
leading to optimal reservation quantity, by solving program (3), as provided in the theorem.
Theorem 1
The optimal number of options Q * (e, r) as a function of the execution fee e and the reservation fee r is given implicitly by
E is the expectation operator. The Theorem allows the following intuitive interpretation: The left hand side of equation (5) is the buyer's expected marginal willingness-to-pay at the reservation level in the presence of a spot market alternative, which should equal the expected price for an option, again when the buyer has the option to recur to the spot market. The latter is, of course, represented by the right hand side: The reservation fee r has to be paid whenever the buyer decides to participate in the contract market, while in the spot market he pays the lower of the execution fee e and the spot priceP s , corresponding to executing his options and purchasing from the spot market, respectively. Wu et al. (2002) , where the spot price is the only state-contingent parameter, obtain a structurally equivalent result as compared to equation (5), as long as the relative position of the intersection of spot price and marginal WTP with respect to the execution fee are identical. Hence the structural equivalence, even though, of course, the quantity Q * (e, r)
derived here differs from that in the non-state-contingent marginal WTP case.
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Corollary 1 The solution to equation (5) can be characterized as follows:
1. The buyer's expected utility,V A (Q, e, r), is strictly concave in Q. Hence if there is a solution Q * > 0 to equation (5), it is unique and optimal in the range given by Lemma 2.
2. The reservation quantity Q * (e, r) is strictly decreasing in e and r, i.e., ∂Q * ∂e < 0 and
3. r ≥ 0, ∀ ω.
Forward Contract
It is interesting to consider forward contracts, which serve for the buyer to hedge against spot price fluctuations without the flexibility, however, of an options contract.
Lemma 3 Within the options contract framework considered here, a forward contract is merely a special case with the execution fee e set being to zero.
3 Case B can be excluded when demand is certain.
Thus, inserting e = 0 into the results derived in the previous paragraph immediately yields the solutions for the forward case. We note the following corollary which indicates the optimal reservation policy in case of forward contracts.
Corollary 2 The number of forwards purchased by the buyer Q * (r) is given by the implicit equation
Note that the reservation fee given by equation (6) is smaller than the expected spot price which is due to the fact that the buyer has the additional sourcing opportunity from the back-stop technology in the spot market.
Case B: Partial Execution
In case B, the following consumption pattern is optimal in period 1.
Lemma 4 For some states of the world it is now optimal to consume an amount larger than zero, but smaller than the pre-contracted Q (see Table 2 ). where the buyer consumes a state-contingent amount of options, which is smaller than the pre-contracted amount Q. Furthermore, the buyer either executes options or purchases from the spot market, never both.
With the lemma, the buyer's expected utility can be represented as
The optimal number of options Q * , as a solution to program (3), is given in the Theorem below.
Theorem 2 For case B, the optimal number of options Q * (e, r) the buyer should purchase is given implicitly by
Since the buyer never purchases from both the spot market and the contract, the optimal reservation quantity Q * does not depend on the spot priceP s . The right-hand side of equation (8) represents the expected price the buyer would pay for an additional unit of reserved capacity: Payment of the reservation fee r and the lower of his marginal WTP and the execution fee, which correspond to consuming part of the pre-contracted quantity or the entire amount, respectively. Equivalent properties as noted in Corollary 1 are obtained.
Synopsis Buyer's Problem
As a corollary to Theorems 1 and 2, it is possible to indicate the buyer's behavior with respect to reservation quantities in the e − r−plane.
Corollary 3 The buyer's optimal reservation policy is given by
Figure 2 illustrates the corollary. Note that the maximum reservation fee r for which the buyer is still willing to purchase options is limited by the expected spot priceP s , while the execution fee may stretch out well beyondP s , depending on the support of the probability distribution F . Hence the buyer finds it in his own interest to contract from the supplier even for the sum of reservation and execution fee being larger than the expected spot price, i.e., r + e >P s . Note that the limiting values of e and r for each regime defined by the corollary merely depend on the state-contingent part of the buyer's WTP function.
The Seller's Optimal Tariff
We represent the seller's expected profit bȳ
where the first two terms account for the profit generated through the long-term contract.
The marginal cost of production,b c , is assumed to be constant w.r.t. the output quantity.
However, the costs are modeled to be state-contingent, due to the fact that fuel costs or direct labor costs may fluctuate substantially depending on the state of the economy.
The superscript c serves to distinguish between the marginal costs related to long-term contract-based capacity allocation and those associated with short-term spot allocation, which we denote byb s . Empirical evidence suggests thatb c <b s (Scherer and Ross, 1990) . above with the spot priceP s , thus rising less steeply than the spot price for improving economic conditions. The third term represents the profit derived from spot market sales, wherem represents an exogenous risk factor related to not being able to find a last-minute buyer:m(P s ), 0 ≤m ≤ 1, withm monotonically decreasing in the spot price. K is the total capacity of the seller, assumed to be fixed due to non-scalability for the industries we have in mind, e.g., air cargo. The (. . .) + operator assures that there is no spot market sale below cost, as one would observe in practice. The last term in equation (10) displays the cost of holding capacity K, whereβ is the unit capacity cost per period.
Case A: Full Execution
We first analyze the optimal seller's tariff for the case denoted by A above. The expected profit can be determined using the results from Table 1 .
By calculating dΠ de = ∂Π ∂e + ∂Π ∂r dr de (for fixed Q), we obtain the first order condition for the optimal execution fee e * .
Theorem 3 The optimal execution fee e * for the seller is equal to the contract-related marginal cost where it intersects with the spot price, i.e.,
Note that one of the key results from Wu et al. (2002) , who established for non-statecontingent cost that the optimal reservation fee is equal to marginal cost, still holds in our framework, however adapted to the cost being state contingent. Since the buyer executes his options only in the event thatP s > e, i.e., ω > Ψ −1 (e * /p), (see Table 1 ), we can conclude that the seller sets the execution fee at or below cost throughout the execution regime. We shall see next that the seller compensates for this potential loss through setting the reservation fee r * appropriately.
The following theorem illustrates how r * is to be set with e * given by Theorem 3. We denote by r (Q) the elasticity of option demand with respect to the reservation fee r, i.e.,
Theorem 4 The optimal reservation fee r * is
The seller sets the execution fee equal to his lowest marginal cost level in the range of states where options are executed. The potential loss he incurs for states where the marginal costb c is above the execution fee is compensated by the reservation fee as reflected in the first term of the numerator of the reservation fee. The second term in the numerator accounts for the seller's opportunity cost of reserving capacity in the contract market, because he might have had the chance to sell capacity in the spot market at a higher spot price. Figure 3 shows the two components of the seller's optimal reservation fee r * . As a consequence, the seller uses the reservation fee r * to hedge against two risks: the risk of increasing costs and the risk of increasing spot price. The reservation fee is inflated by a factor incorporating the elasticity of demand for the options. As one would expect, the less elastic the demand for options, the larger the reservation fee. If Q * ≥ K, see the second line in equation (13), then the seller sets the reservation fee r * at the highest level acceptable for the buyer, who purchases then exactly K as can be seen from Theorem 1.
Note that the reservation fee for forward contracts can be calculated by setting e = 0 in Theorem 4.
Case B: Partial Execution
Remember that in case B, the number of options executed was state-contingent, over a certain range of states (see Table 2 ). Therefore, we obtain for the expected profit the following expression
However, as it turns out, it is not possible to derive an explicit expression for e from the first order condition, neither for the reservation fee r. Furthermore, the optimal e * is now dependent on Q. Still, we are able to give an indication where the optimal value lies with respect to that for case A.
Theorem 5 The optimal execution fee in case B is larger than that in case A, i.e., e * B > e * A .
It is now of interest to determine when case A or case B occurs. Since the seller leads the game by bidding the tariff (r, e) and thereby selects one of the cases (see also Lemma 1), he will make his choice dependent on which case yields higher expected profit for him.
To solve this issue, we first need to compute the equilibrium quantities in each case.
Equilibrium Quantity 3.3.1 Case A: Full Execution
Having determined the optimal execution and reservation fee, e * and r * , respectively, we are able to compute the equilibrium quantity of options purchased by the buyer, Q * (e * , r * ).
Theorem 6
The equilibrium quantity Q * in case A is given by
To investigate the dependence of Q * onm, let us fix for the remainder of this paragraph the spot market riskm ≡ m.
Corollary 4
The equilibrium quantity increases with increasing risk of not finding a lastminute buyer, i.e., ∂Q * ∂m < 0.
Thus, as the seller faces increasing risk of not finding buyers on short notice, he offers the buyer a more favorable tariff entailing a larger equilibrium quantity. This result holds also for the forward case and for case B.
Let us define a special case concerning the marginal cost for contract and spot market based allocation, respectively:b c ≡b s − ∆, ∆ > 0. Hence, we assume that the cost difference is constant for all states of the world. The following result holds:
Corollary 5 The equilibrium quantity increases with increasing cost gap, i.e.,
The explanation for this relationship is similar to the one given above for the dependence on m.
Forward Contract
We proceed in the same fashion to determine the equilibrium quantity Q * (r * ) in the forward case.
Theorem 7
The equilibrium quantity Q * in the forward case is given by
Case B: Partial Execution
Remember from above that an analytical expression for the optimal execution fee e * cannot be provided in this case. However, we can derive an expression for the equilibrium quantity, which of course is still dependent on e * .
Theorem 8
The equilibrium quantity in case B is given by
Full vs. Partial Execution
The seller decides which of the two cases will occur, based on which case yields higher expected profit for him. Let us denote all parameters pertaining to case A by a superscript A, to case B by a superscript B. We know from Theorem 5 that e * B > e * A . Nonetheless, Q * A may be smaller or larger than Q * B , depending on the relative sizes of the reservation fee r * A , r * B respectively. If indeed Q * B is larger than Q * A , then r * B must be smaller than r * A due to ∂Q * ∂r < 0. Referring back to Figure 2 , we see that r * B can only be larger in the regime where the borderline between case A and B is increasing, hence for very small marginal cost when compared to expected spot price. The profit difference and hence the decision criterion for
and so forth. The sign of the profit difference depends on the specific functional form of the marginal costsb c ,b s , on the risk factorm and the probability distribution F . Thus predicting whether case A or case B will occur is possible once the respective functions are completely specified and numerical analysis can be applied.
This fact does not limit the scope of our analysis. Our aim is to analyze the options scenario in its most general setting, which enables us to determine analytical results for the buyer's and seller's strategies in both case A and case B.
Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate that the combination of contract and spot market is Pareto improving versus a pure spot market and versus the combination of a pure forward and a spot market, regardless of whether case A or case B obtains. This key result is derived in the section on welfare properties.
Capacity Utilization
In many industries, e.g., air cargo, a consistently high capacity utilization, especially in the presence of substantial demand uncertainty, is a prerequisite for being successful in the market. Indeed, the expected capacity utilization that can be obtained either in a long-term options contract plus spot market scheme,C o , or through the combination of forward and spot market,C f , is larger than that resulting from a pure spot market,C s , as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 5 For the capacity utilization, the following relationships hold:
The second inequality in each case is strict wheneverm < 1.
Welfare Properties and Conditions for Trade
The rationale for establishing a contracting market in addition to a spot market will stem from an increase in economic efficiency. As a measure of expected overall welfare, we definē W ≡V (e * , r * , Q * ) +Π(e * , r * , Q * ).
Welfare Comparison: Options vs. Spot Market only
To compare the combined options plus spot market scenario with one where we have a pure spot market, we first need to determine the expected utility of the buyerV s and the expected profit of the sellerΠ s in the latter case:
We need to compare the spot-market-only-case to both case A and B in the options scenario. Note that, as far as the seller's profit is concerned, it is sufficient to show that
B is greater thanΠ s and ifΠ A >Π B , the seller would not choose B anyway. Indeed, the following theorem shows the superiority of the options scenario when compared to a pure spot market in terms of economic efficiency. Let us denote by a superscript o the prevailing case in the options scenario.
Theorem 9
The combination of an options and a spot market is strictly Pareto improving as compared to a pure spot market, i.e.,V o >V s andΠ o >Π s .
As a caveat, note that transaction costs, such as search and informational costs, have not been taken into account for the additional contract market. However, as Bakos (1997) points out in the context of B2C-markets, electronic markets tend to reduce search costs substantially. Given the assumption that the presence of the contract market does not impact the spot price (see section 3), the enhanced economic efficiency of the options scenario is immediately clear since it enlarges the decision space of the two market players as compared to the pure spot market at no additional cost. The seller and the buyer could always limit themselves to the spot market even in the combined scenario. The additional benefit from lower marginal costb c can be tapped through the contract market only, and
we shall see next how this lower cost impacts overall welfare.
With respect to practical implementation of the options market, it will be crucial to find the key determinants of the overall welfare differenceW
Corollary 6 The welfare differenceW o −W s increases with larger cost difference between short and long term allocation, i.e.,
For fixed m, we get furthermore:
Corollary 7 The overall welfare differenceW o −W s increases with the risk of not finding a last-minute buyer, i.e.,
As a consequence, industries where at least one of these characteristics is important will be particularly well suited to this options contract and spot market scheme.
Note that nothing has been said about how the additional welfare should be shared among the buyer and the seller. Within the context of electronic markets, the gain of efficiency allows one of the parties to afford relationship-specific investments to overcome a potential liquidity barrier in the first place.
Welfare Comparison: Options vs. Forwards
It is also of interest to compare the welfare in the options scenario with that of a pure forward plus spot market scenario. Note that the seller's profit is larger for e = e * > 0 than for e = 0 as follows from Theorem 3. Therefore, it is sufficient to verify improvement for the buyer's utility, for both case A and B, against the forward case.
Theorem 10 The combination of a pure options and a spot market is strictly Pareto improving as compared to a combination of a pure forward and a spot market, i.e.,
Thus, we find that the enhanced flexibility provided by the options contract creates benefits for both the buyer and the seller.
Conditions for Trade
The findings from the previous section indicate under what conditions the introduction of contingency contracts is particularly promising due to efficiency gains. Of equal importance, however, is an analysis of conditions for both parties to trade, i.e., to determine the values of the reservation fee acceptable to both parties when the execution fee is set at its optimal value.
Lemma 6 Let e = e * A . Then both parties benefit from trade in the options market if the following is true for the reservation fee r:
The right-hand side of equation (18) represents the maximum reservation fee the buyer is willing to pay (see also Figure 2 ), while the left-hand side is the minimum required by the seller.
Fix againm ≡ m andb c ≡b s − ∆, ∆ > 0. Then we can state the following corollary.
Corollary 8 The bandwidth R of the interval of reservation fees for which both seller and buyer are willing to trade,
has the following properties:
Thus, the two factors identified earlier to have an impact on the welfare difference when the options scenario is compared to other market set-ups influence in an analogous way the range of reservation fees over which trade occurs.
Note that even in the case of a completely riskless spot market, i.e., m ≡ 1, the seller still has an incentive to engage in options trade as long as marginal cost associated with long term capacity allocation is lower for some states of the world than that with short term allocation. It is only in the absence of this cost gap and of any risk in the spot market that the seller refrains from trading capacity long-term.
Managerial Implications
The preceding analysis highlights two key areas where the benefits of contingency contracts can be exploited: as a risk-sharing instrument and as a tool to enable superior planning.
Each of these aspects shall be elaborated on in the following.
The first aspect can be covered, for a narrow range of standard commodities, via purely financial hedging instruments that are traded in highly liquid exchanges like the Chicago Exchange. For trades of products or services beyond the standard commodities, however, contractual flexibility is rarely available or not priced taking the underlying exogenous risks properly into account. The contracting scheme proposed here provides a means of remedy because the tariff reflects the spot price and cost risks. Trade can be accomplished either on a bilateral basis, as shown here, or via electronic market platforms. The buyer's contract and spot consumption portfolio illustrates the flexibility the buyer obtains from the options contract, which enables him to react on states of the world that alter his demand originally forecasted. The expression for the buyer's optimal reservation quantity is intuitively appealing, since it is equivalent to equating the expected payment for an additional option with expected marginal willingness-to-pay at the reserved number of options.
For the seller, we have determined the optimal two-part tariff: the execution fee is equal to marginal cost at the state of the world where spot price equals marginal cost. As the seller sets the execution fee in this way, margin is extracted from the buyer via the reservation fee. The reservation fee is key for the seller to hedge against cost and price uncertainty: It incorporates the opportunity cost of early commitment in the contract market as well as the risk of the marginal cost rising above the committed execution fee. Moreover, as Wu et al. (2002) point out, the reservation fee may also constitute a contribution by the buyer to the financing cost of the seller's project.
Besides risk-sharing, the impact of superior capacity planning thanks to the information revealed in the contracting session is worth to be discussed. In general, there is a timing trade-off with respect to the contract market: early occurrence enables the seller to amply exploit the cost difference between long-and short-term allocation, which favorably affects efficiency gains, while later occurrence would provide both parties with more precise estimates on future demand and cost levels, which would reduce the required level of flexibility to act on future contingencies. From the buyer's perspective, the immediately payable reservation fee is an incentive to correctly indicate demand levels in the contracting period, which may not be the case without financial obligation, as Cachon and Lariviere (1999) emphasize, then leading to inefficient gaming behavior in the course of capacity reservation.
We have demonstrated gains in economic efficiency for the options plus spot market, which render risk-sharing and planning instruments via options particularly attractive. The gains increase with higher risk of finding a last-minute buyer and with increasing cost gap between long-term and short-term allocation. As a consequence, we can identify a number of industries that could benefit from the set-up proposed above, for instance within newly deregulated electricity markets, where spot price volatility is particularly pronounced and cost savings enabled through the use of different generator types. Contract manufacturing and transportation services, where capacity is capital intensive and demand varies substantially dependent on the state of the economy, are prime candidates for implementation. Hellermann and Huchzermeier (2002) shows in a case study on Lufthansa Cargo AG the evolution of contracting from fixed volume contracts with scarce return rights towards more flexible contracts, capitalizing on the mutual gains of risk-sharing.
Conclusion
We have provided a game-theoretic framework to value options on capacity for production of non-storable goods or dated services, taking into account key features of industrial markets, i.e., pronounced spot price volatility and substantial demand and cost uncertainty.
We have identified hedging opportunities against these types of risk, based on the analytic expressions for the seller's bidding and the buyer's purchasing strategies, respectively. The rationale for implementing a scenario consisting of a long-term options contract and a spot market is an enhanced economic efficiency when compared to alternative market set-ups.
Our research lays the foundation for future work in this area: In a first step, the analytical work done here should be complemented with more in-depth empirical research on implementation opportunities in the industrial areas indicated above. In parallel, the simple rules derived above for the buyer and the seller should be subjected to laboratory experiments based on intelligent agents technology, which fuels a number of current market places, and which is able to closely emulate game theoretic market models. On the theoretical side, the spot market could be linked more firmly to the contract market by allowing either the seller or the buyer to influence the spot market price. This is important with regard to oligopolistic industry structures that can be encountered, e.g., in UK's electricity market (Newbery, 1998) , and will impact the market participants' strategies as well as economic efficiency in an interesting way. In a second step, it will be valuable to further analyze the informational role played by the contract market session and concretize the timing of the two sessions.
More comprehensively, the opportunity of risk hedging through options contracts propagated here allows the firm to establish a tight link between operations decisions and financial performance. Further exploration of contract types aiming at this aspect will be rewarding.
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A Proofs
Lemma 1, Lemma 2 Perform the maximization on program (2) making use of the theorem of Kuhn and Tucker for a generalŨ , i.e.,increasing and concave in the quantity, increasing in ω, which yields Table 3 . q e * qs * Inserting the affine separable form forŨ as specified in section 3.1, one obtains case A for e ≥ pΨ(Λ −1 (pQ/Z 1 (Q))), case B if the reverse is true. Since the seller is the von Stackelberg leader of the game, he chooses which case will occur by setting e. Lemma 2 follows from applying Lemma 3, Corollary 2 If e is set to zero (which is possible only in case A, see Lemma 1), then the user always executes his options since e ≤P s , ∀ ω, leading to a forward price of r. For the corollary, Set e = 0 in equation (5) (5) 
We need to distinguish two cases: (1) e ≤ b s (Ψ −1 (e/p)) ⇒ e * = b c (Ψ −1 (e * /p)). 
from which we obtain the solution as stated in the theorem for Q * < K. 
which yields, using equ. Note that in the second term, the argument (e/p) of Ψ −1 has been omitted. If we set, similar to case (a), e * = b c (Ψ −1 (e * /p)), then we are left with a residual term, the first term in equ. (23), which is greater than zero. It is easy to show thatΠ is concave in e, hence the statement made in the theorem obtains. Theorem 9 Since a partial equilibrium is considered here with no party altering the spot market price, adding the contract market at zero transaction cost simply enlarges the buyer's and seller's decision space. Both could always resort to relying on the spot market only. Thus the proof. 2.
Corollary 6 For case A one gets 
